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Before Justices Lagarde, Maloney, and Miller (Note: 1)
Opinion By Justice Miller
Evan Brown appeals an order granting a temporary injunction. DSC Communications Corporation, Inc. sued appellant for allegedly breaching his employment agreement by failing to disclose a computer program appellant developed during his employment with appellee. In two points of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in granting the temporary injunction because: (1) the injunction disturbs the status quo and awards appellee full and final relief; (2) appellee failed to demonstrate that it had no adequate remedy at law or would suffer an irreparable injury; and (3) the injunction enforces an agreement which is not supported by consideration. Because we conclude this interlocutory appeal was unnecessary, we affirm the trial court's order.
Appellee develops, markets, and manufactures software and telecommunications equipment for the telecommunications industry. In 1987, appellee hired appellant, a software engineer. Appellant signed an employment agreement (the Agreement) which provided, in part:
Several years later, while still an employee of appellee, appellant thought of a computer solution (the Solution) that would automatically translate older software into a newer, more efficient computer language. According to appellant, he had been working on the problem since 1975, well before he came to work for appellee. He "saw the last piece of the puzzle" in 1997, while driving back from Hamilton County. Appellant has not reduced the solution to writing; it remains only an idea.
Appellant sent a memo to his supervisor stating that he had thought of the solution. Appellant requested appellee to release him from the Agreement and allow him, rather than appellee, to develop and patent the Solution. Appellant and appellee negotiated a method which would allow appellant to share the cost savings that the Solution would provide. After they were unable to reach an agreement, appellee sued appellant for breach of contract. Appellee also requested the trial court to enjoin appellant from developing and marketing the Solution and also to require appellant to disclose the Solution to appellee.
On May 2, 1997, the trial judge conducted a hearing on appellee's request for a temporary injunction. Following the hearing, the trial judge ordered, among other things, appellant to disclose the Solution to appellee. On June 27, 1997, the presiding administrative judge granted appellant's motion to disqualify the trial judge and a new trial judge was assigned. On June 30, 1997, the assigned judge conducted a second hearing on the temporary injunction. At the June hearing, the assigned judge took judicial notice of the May hearing before the disqualified judge. One additional witness, a patent attorney for appellee, testified. Following the June hearing, the assigned judge ordered appellant, among other things, to disclose the Solution to appellee. The June order set the trial on the merits for November 3, 1997. This interlocutory appeal followed.
It is well-settled that our review of the granting of a temporary injunction is strictly limited to a determination of whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion in entering the interlocutory order. See Davis v. Hitey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex. 1978); Hiss v. Great North American Companies, Inc., 871 S.W.2d 218, 219 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1993, no writ); Priest v. Texas Animal Health Commission, 780 S.W.2d 874, 875 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1989, no writ). The trial court has broad discretion in determining whether the pleadings and evidence support a temporary injunction. Recon Exploration, Inc. v. Hodges, 798 S.W.2d 848, 851 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1990, no writ). Abuse of discretion does not exist if the trial court heard conflicting evidence and evidence appears in the record which reasonably supports the trial court's decision. Id. at 852. We may reverse a trial court for an abuse of discretion only if, after searching the record, it is clear that the trial court's decision was arbitrary and unreasonable. Simon v. York Crane & Rigging Co., 739 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex. 1987).
The only issue to be determined in a temporary injunction hearing is whether the applicant may preserve the status quo of the suit's subject matter pending a trial on the merits. Davis, 571 S.W.2d at 862; Hiss, 871 S.W.2d at 219. Applicants may not use the appeal of a temporary injunction ruling to get an advance ruling on the merits of the case. Iranian Muslim Org. v. City of San Antonio, 615 S.W.2d 202, 208 (Tex. 1981); Hiss, 871 S.W.2d at 219.
Nor should the appeal of a temporary injunction be cause for trial delay. Coalition Cities for Affordable Util. Rates v. Third Ct. of Appeals, 787 S.W.2d 946, 947 (Tex. 1990) (per curium); Hiss, 871 S.W.2d at 219; Recon, 798 S.W.2d at 853. Trial courts should proceed expeditiously from the grant or denial of temporary injunctive relief to full consideration of the merits to reduce the need for interlocutory appeals. Hiss, 871 S.W.2d at 219. The fastest way to cure the hardship of an unfavorable preliminary order is to try the case on the merits. Id.; Recon, 798 S.W.2d at 854. For the parties to seek and the trial court to grant an abatement, stay, or continuance in the trial court while the court of appeals considers an interlocutory appeal increases delay and expense. See Coalition of Cities, 787 S.W.2d at 947; Hiss, 871 S.W.2d at 219.
At oral argument, we questioned both counsel about the trial on the merits. Counsel informed this Court that the November 3, 1997 trial setting, both parties agreed to continue that resolution of point of error two, complaining that the temporary injunction enforces an agreement which is not supported by consideration, may be outcome determinative. Because this appeal seeks an advanced ruling on the merits of the case, we conclude this interlocutory appeal is unnecessary. See Hiss, 871 S.W.2d at 220. We overrule points of error one and two. Because the parties agreed to continue the trial on the merits awaiting this Court's decision, we order the parties to pay their own costs of this appeal. Tex.R.App.P.89 (former rules). (Note: 2)
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Note: 1
The Honorable Chuck Miller, Judge, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Retired, sitting by assignment.
Note: 2
The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure were amended September 1, 1997. In the final approval order, the supreme court provided that the amended rules applied to appeals perfected on or after September 1, 1997. Because this appeal was perfected prior to September 1, 1997, we conclude the former appellate rules apply.
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